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Abstract
This study analyzes the impact of fi scal policy on income inequality for the Bra-
zilian states over the period 2004-2014. Using the GMM system, we fi nd robust 
evidence that, while increases in total expenditure, spending with social assistance 
and security, and expenditure on infrastructure reduce inequality, total and capital 
revenues and expenditures related to public debt increase inequality. Thus, the net 
effect of fi scal policy on inequality may not be positive mainly because the tax sys-
tem is still very regressive and many of the resources are spent on debt. Therefore, 
the discussion of how to determine and qualify social spending levels in Brazil, 
which are necessary to fi ght poverty and reduce social and income inequalities, is 
directly related to the revision of the tax collection system.
Keywords: fi scal policy, public spending, inequality, Brazilian states.
JEL codes: O10, O15, E62.
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Resumo
Este estudo analisa o impacto da política fi scal sobre a desigualdade de renda para 
os estados brasileiros no período 2004-2014. Utilizando system GMM, encontra-
mos evidências robustas de que, enquanto o aumento no gasto total, gastos com 
assistência social e segurança, e gastos em infra-estrutura reduzem a desigualdade, 
as receitas totais e de capital e os gastos relacionados à dívida pública aumentam a 
desigualdade. Assim, o efeito líquido da política fi scal sobre a desigualdade pode 
não ser positivo, principalmente porque o sistema tributário ainda é muito regres-
sivo e muitos dos recursos são gastos em dívidas. Portanto, a discussão sobre 
como determinar e qualifi car os níveis de gastos sociais no Brasil, necessários para 
combater a pobreza e reduzir as desigualdades sociais e de renda, está diretamente 
relacionada à revisão do sistema de arrecadação de impostos.
Palavras chave: política fi scal, gasto público, desigualdade, estados brasileiros.
Códigos JEL: O10, O15, E62.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of inequality has assumed a prominent place in debates on eco-
nomic policy, especially following the global fi nancial crisis and the academic and 
political repercussions of Piketty’s book (2014). This debate has drawn attention 
to the capacity and importance that fi scal policy may have in mitigating income 
imbalances among individuals in an economy. 
Fiscal policy can affect the welfare of individuals through direct monetary 
payments or through government provision of free services. In other words, fi scal 
policy can have an immediate impact on income distribution, for example, with 
benefi t payments or tax rates on current income, or it can have effects only in the 
medium or long terms, such as expenses in child education. In turn, it is impor-
tant not to forget that the distributive role of fi scal policy can produce negative 
externalities since some tax and spending policies used for this purpose can distort 
incentives and reduce economic effi ciency (Clements et al., 2015).
In this context, the main objective of this study is to empirically estimate 
the impact of the structure of expenditures and revenues on income inequality for 
the Brazilian states. That is, what is the impact of fi scal policy on the inequality 
of the Brazilian states? What types of expenditure and revenues contribute to the 
reduction of inequality? Moreover, is it possible that the reductive effect on income 
inequality obtained since the beginning of the 2000s and resulted from programs 
that target income transfers at poor households, has been partially softened by the 
Brazilian regressive fi scal structure?
The contribution of this article is to provide evidence of the relationship bet-
ween fi scal policy, examining simultaneously tax and public spending, and income 
inequality at the level of the Brazilian states, fi lling an existing gap in the literature. 
In addition, this research provides justifi cations for policy makers to implement fi scal 
policies, here considered as public expenditure and tax structures, that promote to the 
reduction of income inequality in the country. Programs that target income transfers 
at poor households are important to reduce inequality in income distribution, but their 
effects can be offset if the tax collection structure is not directed at the distributive 
goal. Lastly, it should be emphasized that analyzing the issues of allocative effi ciency 
in the expenditure policies of the Brazilian states is not within the scope of the present 
study, even though the authors recognize the relevance of such an issue.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II is a lit-
erature review. Section III summarizes the evolution of the intergovernmental fi s-
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cal structure in Brazil. Section IV includes the data and methodology. Section V 
provides the main results. Section VI shows the robustness evaluations. The paper 
ends with some concluding remarks. 
I. TAXES, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Although Kuznet’s (1955) hypothesis of an inverted U-curve in the rela-
tionship between economic growth and income distribution remains controversial, 
enthusiasm for this hypothesis has been decreasing since the study by Deininger 
and Squire (1996). This decreased enthusiasm has made room in recent decades for 
the argument that the level of income inequality, especially in developing countries, 
can be reduced by the direct action of public policies, especially fi scal policies 
(TANZI, CHU, 1992). However, according to Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), it 
is important to evaluate the design of these policies to determine their success in 
reducing income inequality and benefi ting the poorest populations. 
Analyses of the relationship between economic development, inequality 
in income distribution and fi scal policy are found, among others, in Bastagli et al. 
(2012), Chu et al. (2004) and Woo et al. (2013). The conclusion of these studies is 
that inequality in income distribution can be partially explained by the level and 
progressiveness of taxes and government spending policies. These studies also note 
that, in general, direct taxes and social spending tend to improve the income distri-
bution of the economy, while indirect taxes tend to increase inequality. In addition, 
the results of Woo et al. (2013) indicate that fi scal policy may favor the long-term 
trends of both inequality and growth by promoting education and training among 
low-and middle-income workers. This conclusion is in line with the evidence pre-
sented by Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012) for 150 countries, which detected the 
occurrence of an increase in income inequality in the period from 1970 to 2009 and 
a fall in the share of income tax in total tax collection and spending on education.
Highlighting the negative effects of poor income distribution on economic 
growth in Latin American countries and using data from the beginning of the 2000 
decade, Goñi et al. (2011) concluded that the fi scal system of these countries fails 
to fulfi ll its redistributive function1. However, from the second decade of the 21st 
1 The development of most Latin American countries was characterized by persistent problems related 
to income inequality throughout the 20th century, as presented in Bértola and Ocampo (2012). 
However, some studies indicate that in the last two decades, inequality in income distribution has 
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century, several studies have emerged showing the positive role of the fi scal system 
in improving the income distribution in the countries of this region. Cornia (2014) 
found evidence that, as of 2002, taxes and social spending, among other variables, 
are signifi cant factors for the improvement of the income distribution in the coun-
tries of Latin America. González and Martner (2012) also identifi ed a positive effect 
of fi scal policy on income distribution, particularly for social spending, expenditure 
on education, public investment, and an indicator of the progressiveness of the tax 
system. In a more recent study, Clifton et al. (2017) argued that during the 1960-
1998 period, fi scal policy was not a relevant explanatory factor for the reduction 
in inequality in income distribution in Latin America. Nevertheless, for the 1990-
2012 period, the authors concluded that fi scal policy contributed to the reduction of 
inequality in income distribution, mainly via public spending on health and taxes 
that act progressively on income.
Several studies on South American countries have analyzed in more detail 
the impact of taxes and expenditures, together or separately, on income distribution. 
Here, we present some of those studies that perform a joint analysis of expenses 
and taxes. Bucheli et al. (2014) showed that Uruguay has a tax system that, in terms 
of both expenses and taxes, is favorable to the distributive function of the State. 
Although indirect taxes are regressive, the progressiveness of direct taxation more 
than compensates for this effect, making the Uruguayan tax structure an equalizing 
element on income in the country. With respect to expenditure, due to the weight 
of expenditures related to health and education and due to direct income transfers 
to the poorest segments of the population, the progressiveness of Uruguay’s tax 
system has deepened.
Another country in the region that seems to have a tax system with a dis-
tributive character is Argentina. Rossignolo (2018), using data for the year 2012, 
concluded that both the net effect of direct and indirect expenditures and taxes help 
reduce income disparity and poverty in Argentina, even with the regressivity of 
indirect taxation. He also pointed out that the progressive character of the Argentine 
tax system has been reinforced since the beginning of the year 2000. 
This evolution is proven in an ingenious work by Cont and Porto (2016). 
These authors used data on household income and fi scal policy in Argentina for the 
period from 1995 to 2010 to estimate the income distribution produced by market 
forces (ex-ante income); one estimation results from adding public cash transfers 
declined in most of its countries, although Latin America still presents indexes above the world 
average (Cornia, 2014).
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and subtracting direct taxes (interim income), and another estimation results from 
adding in-kind public goods and subtracting indirect taxes (ex-post income). From 
these estimates, the authors calculated the Gini indexes and measured the impact of 
different types of public expenditure and taxes, both related to the central govern-
ment and the provinces. The estimated data indicate that fi scal policy in Argentina 
has been able to increase its capacity to reduce income disparity among families, 
mainly through the expenses of the governments of the provinces and those related 
to direct cash transfers for lower-income families.
Another country that seems to have evolved in the progressiveness of its tax 
system throughout the fi rst decade of the 21st century is Peru. According to Jarami-
llo (2017), by observing the evolution of the Peruvian government’s spending and 
collection structure between 2005 and 2011, it is possible to infer an improvement 
in the levels of progressivity of expenditures, thanks mainly to the adoption of 
direct income transfer programs and of direct taxes. However, the regressivity of 
indirect taxes keeps the system on the revenue side neutral. In addition, the volume 
of resources and coverage of income transfer programs are still relatively small to 
contribute substantially to poverty reduction and income inequality in the country. 
Similar results are found for Colombia, according to Joumard and Vélez (2013). 
These authors emphasized the low level of tax burden in the country, its concen-
tration on indirect taxes, the low progressivity in income tax, the small coverage 
of income transfer programs and the regressivity in the social security system as 
explanatory factors for the reduced distributive role of the Colombian tax system.
Using data for the year 2013 Martinez-Aguilar et al. (2016) showed how 
Chile, since the beginning of the 21st century, has been creating various govern-
ment programs and actions that have succeeded in making its tax structure more 
equal and favorable to the poorest sections of the population. Through estimates 
of the state’s tax and spending impacts, the authors indicated that both direct and 
indirect taxes and expenditures help reduce income differentials and alleviate the 
extent and depth of poverty in the country. The effi ciency of direct transfer pro-
grams, such as income supplementation programs, with their equivalent cost of 
1.6% of the GDP, produced a reduction of 5.4% in the Gini index.
Higgins and Perreira (2014) evaluated the distributive effects of fi scal policy 
in Brazil for the years 2008 and 2009. Although these authors underlined the pro-
gressive aspects of social policies in the country, especially those of direct income 
transfer such as the Bolsa Família Program, they concluded that the consolidated 
effect of fi scal policy was regressive and unfavorable to the poorest segment of the 
population. This conclusion is mainly due to the large weight of indirect taxes in 
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the tax collection system, approximately 55%, and the impact of such taxes on the 
price of the typical consumer basket of lower-income families. Medeiros and Souza 
(2015) were even more forceful in assessing the unfavorable role of Brazilian fi scal 
policy in the distribution of income. Evaluating only the direct monetary fl ows bet-
ween families and the public sector, thus without considering the impact of indirect 
taxes, they concluded that (mostly through the public sector workers’ earnings and 
pensions) the Brazilian State contributes heavily to raising the Gini index in the 
country, being unable to impose direct taxation to counterbalance this effect. In 
fact, as Gobetti and Orair (2017) noted, the main direct tax in Brazil, the income 
tax, has a lower progressivity index than those observed in Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, and it is well below the average estimated for OECD member countries.
Although Cont and Porto (2016) have found evidence that the expenditures 
of subnational units (provinces) in Argentina are the main determinants of fi scal 
policy progressivity, there is no consensus in the literature on the impact of fi scal 
decentralization on income disparity. Bartolini et al. (2016) showed that for a posi-
tive impact of fi scal decentralization to on the less developed subnational units local 
governments must be able to increase their own tax base, specially through public 
policies capable of attracting new factors and productive resources for the region or 
or using local resources more effi ciently. In short, the effective relationship between 
fi scal decentralization and income inequality is an empirical question.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL STRUCTURE 
IN BRAZIL
The implementation of a new federal constitution, in 1988, in an already 
democratic regime, gave greater autonomy, especially to the states, in fi scal mana-
gement. Based on Public Choice Theory, the expectation was that fi scal decentra-
lization would enable a greater linkage between tax decisions, especially spending 
decisions, and the preferences and needs of the local population, as formulated by 
Oates (1972). Likewise, in the political sphere, the idea was to promote the so-
called “horizontal distribution”, directing more resources from the federal gover-
nment to the states, especially the less developed ones.
However, without proper mechanisms of transparency, control and accounta-
bility of public managers, this autonomy was confi gured in subnational units, mainly 
states, with increasing fi scal defi cits and levels of public debt. This situation forced 
the country to promote institutional advances in terms of public fi nance management 
at all levels of the federation throughout the second half of the 1990s, beginning 
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with the Program for Support of Restructuring and Fiscal Adjustment of States and 
culminating in the promulgation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000. Among 
the highlights of this law was the legal defi nition that any new expenditure can only 
be created in the public budget when it has a proper provision for revenue.
These reforms established a new phase in the Brazilian tax administration at 
all federal levels. From an eminently qualitative perspective, the subnational entities 
lost their autonomy in the decisions of indebtedness, including being forbidden to 
issue bonds of public debt. The contracting of fi nancing operations by state gover-
nments was under the control of the federal government. Thus, with no capacity to 
contract new debt, subnational entities began to make efforts to broaden their tax 
bases and improve institutional capacity for public management. This situation has 
been partially reversed as of 2009, when the federal government sought to minimize 
the effects of the international crisis on the Brazilian economy, once again allowing 
states and municipalities to contract new fi nancing to increase their investment capa-
city and thus helping stimulate aggregate domestic demand. These actions softened 
the impact of the international crisis in Brazil in 2008, 2009 and 2010. However, 
they withdrew from both the federal and state governments the ability to undertake 
countercyclical fi scal policies in the recession period from 2014 to 2017.
II.1. The federal units of Brazil
With a territorial area of 8.5 million km2 and an estimated population of 214 
million in 2018, Brazil comprises 27 subnational units, the objects of our analysis, 
which have relative political and economic autonomy. As indicated in Table 1, these 
units present signifi cant differences in terms of territory population, economic size 
and quality of life. These disparities are also refl ected in the fi scal indicators. 
Table 1. Regional disparities in socioeconomic indicators by Federal Units
FU
Gini DL GDP
pc Area Pop HID Prog ICMS2004 2014 2004 2014
AC 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.74 15 629 164.1 734 0.663 0.29 0.21
AL 0.57 0.50 2.64 1.54 11 218 27.8 3120 0.631 0.16 0.49
AM 0.54 0.53 0.45 0.31 18 560 1559.1 3484 0.674 0.10 0.71
AP 0.54 0.47 0.23 0.41 16 476 142.8 670 0.708 0.17 0.21
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BA 0.56 0.53 1.42 0.4 12 970 564.7 14 017 0.660 0.12 0.68
CE 0.58 0.51 0.92 0.42 12 527 148.9 8452 0.682 0.15 0.66
DF 0.63 0.58 0.28 0.21 60 020 5.8 2570 0.824 0.52 0.40
ES 0.55 0.49 0.73 0.27 28 263 46.1 3515 0.740 0.12 0.77
GO 0.54 0.45 2.21 0.9 22 467 340.1 6004 0.735 0.15 0.80
MA 0.61 0.53 1.74 0.46 10 008 331.9 6575 0.639 0.16 0.46
MG 0.54 0.48 2.24 1.79 21 903 586.5 19 597 0.731 0.19 0.80
MS 0.54 0.49 2.33 0.98 26 863 357.1 2449 0.729 0.14 0.91
MT 0.53 0.46 1.3 0.42 28 164 903.2 3035 0.725 0.14 0.74
PA 0.54 0.49 0.6 0.1 13 995 1248.0 7581 0.646 0.15 0.60
PB 0.59 0.51 1.08 0.37 11 916 56.5 3767 0.658 0.14 0.59
PE 0.61 0.51 1.04 0.58 14 369 98.1 8796 0.673 0.13 0.69
PI 0.59 0.50 1.42 0.61 10 665 251.6 3110 0.646 0.16 0.48
PR 0.55 0.45 1.08 0.58 27 171 199.3 10 445 0.749 0.19 0.81
RJ 0.55 0.52 2.04 1.78 35 194 43.8 15 990 0.761 0.17 0.69
RN 0.57 0.50 0.38 0.16 14 151 52.8 3168 0.684 0.17 0.56
RO 0.52 0.47 1.03 0.62 17 372 237.8 1562 0.690 0.14 0.55
RR 0.58 0.50 0.04 0.18 18 096 224.3 450 0.707 0.24 0.22
RS 0.53 0.48 2.83 2.09 27 654 281.7 10 694 0.746 0.16 0.90
SC 0.46 0.42 1.64 0.45 30 448 95.7 6248 0.774 0.17 0.88
SE 0.56 0.48 0.65 0.57 15 167 21.9 2068 0.665 0.19 0.46
SP 0.53 0.49 2.23 1.48 35 264 248.2 41 262 0.783 0.12 0.91
TO 0.55 0.51 0.35 0.33 15 865 277.7 1383 0.699 0.25 0.31
BR 0.56 0.50 1.24 0.69 21 200 * ** 0.70 0.18 0.61
Source: Area (1.000K2), Population (Pop, 1000 people), Progressivity (Prog.), HID (Human Index Devel-
opment), Liquid Debt (DL, proportion of Total Revenue), ICMS (proportion of Total Revenue), HDI and 
Population are for 2010, and the other variables for 2014. Acre (AC); Alagoas (AL); Amazonas (AM); 
Amapá (AP); Bahia (BA); Ceará (CE); Distrito Federal-Brasília (DF); Espírito Santo (ES); Goiás (GO); 
Maranhão (MA); Minas Gerais (MG); Mato Grosso do Sul (MS); Mato Grosso (MT); Pará (PA); Paraíba 
(PB); Piauí (PI); Paraná (PR); Rio de Janeiro (RJ); Rio Grande do Norte (RN); Rio Grande do Sul (RS); 
Santa Catarina (SC); Sergipe (SE); São Paulo (SP); Tocantins (TO) e; Brasil (BR). * 8516.7; ** 190 746.
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While, for instance, São Paulo e Distrito Federal present socioeconomic indi-
cators similar to those of high-income, with a signifi cant participation of the industrial 
and service sectors, others, such as Piauí e Maranhão, show numbers of low-income 
economies due to their low diversifi cation and relevant participation of low produc-
tivity agriculture. Likewise, there are states with almost complete fi scal autonomy, 
such as São Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul, and those with high dependence on 
central government transfers such as Acre e Amapá. This high dependence is related 
to the lack of a local economic base capable of generating the necessary tax revenue. 
These differences refl ect the large regional economic disparities in Brazil. Due to 
the country’s industrialization pattern throughout the 20th century, the federative 
units located in the Northeast and North regions have lower levels of economic 
development than the units located in the Southeast and South regions.
Between 2004 and 2014, improvements were observed in the income dis-
tribution indicators of the states and in their fi scal situations, measured by the debt 
ratio in proportion to net revenue. Also, there is an increase in the progressivity 
index of most states, measured by the relation between direct and indirect taxes, 
similar to the methods of González and Martner (2012).
Another measure of fi scal effi ciency is the tax autonomy index, measured as 
the ratio between the main state tax, denominated Tax on the Circulation of Goods 
and Services (ICMS, as per its initials in Portuguese), and the total net revenue of 
each state. Considering the average index of the 27 units of the federation, the index 
increased from 0.36 to 0.61 between 2004 and 2014, meaning that such subnational 
units were less dependent on transfers from the federal government to cover their 
expenses. Thus, during the period analyzed in the present study, the states were 
expanding their capacity for fi scal execution and, therefore, intervention on the 
fi nal distribution of income among families.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
III.1. Data
The data related to the fi scal variables used in this research for the Brazilian 
federal units are obtained from the National Treasury Secretary in the accounting 
information of the states in the budget execution item2. The data are in Reais (R$) 
2 In addition to the states and the Federal District, information on the municipalities are also available 
and can be accessed through the link: <http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/contas-anuais>.
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and were defl ated by the National Wide Consumer Price Index (Índice Nacional de 
Preços ao Consumidor Amplo, or IPCA, as per its initials in Portuguese) at Decem-
ber 2014 prices. All variables were calculated in terms of per capita, considering the 
respective populations of each federative unit. Table A.1 in appendix summarizes 
the descriptive statistics.
The Gini index is the measure of inequality and the dependent variable 
utilized in the empirical analyses. The Gini index shows a downward direction, 
decreasing from 0.56 in 2004 to 0.50 in 20143. Evidence from several studies 
suggests that this reduction4 in the inequality of income distribution is associated 
with programs that target income transfers at poor households, especially the Bolsa 
Família Program (PBF, as per its initials in Portuguese) (Góes and Karpowicz, 
2017; Lustig et al., 2013; Soares et al., 2009, 2010)5. Other factors also contributed 
to this reduction, such as the real increase in the minimum wage, the increase in 
formalization in the labor market, and the improvement in workers’ educational 
level (Gonzáles and Martner, 2012).
Public expenditures aimed at improving the living conditions of the popu-
lation are strong candidates for the reduction in income inequality. If directly, by 
public cash transfer programs, it currently raise the disposable income of the bene-
fi ciary individuals; if indirectly, through offering services in education and health 
care, the public expenses enable its benefi ciaries to obtain higher future income. 
Analyzing the behavior of these expenditures – specifi cally education, health ser-
vices, social assistance and social security – it is possible to deduce a negative 
relation with the measure of inequality. As shown in Graph 1, expenditures of the 
federative units in these areas, which as a whole can be termed social expenditure, 
increased in real terms by 91% between 2004 and 2014. This increase corresponds 
to an average annual growth rate of 7%. Together, the expenses in these areas 
accounted for almost 28% of the total expenditure of the Brazilian federative units. 
3 The Gini indexes are from the National Household Sample Survey/Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (PNAD/IBGE, as per its initials in Portuguese).
4 Góes and Karpowicz (2017) stated that, although there was a reduction in the Gini index for Bra-
zil from 0.54 in 2004 to 0.49 in 2014, inequality is still considered high. Based on data from the 
PNAD/2014, the authors indicated that 40% of the labour income of all Brazilian families is con-
centrated in 10% of the wealthiest population, and that the wealthiest 1% receives approximately 
12%, and 0.1% of the wealthiest population receives approximately 2.5%.
5 Soares et al. (2010) investigated how the PBF contributed to the reduction in inequality 
in income distribution and poverty in Brazil between 1999 and 2009 and its potential for 
future contribution. These authors affi rmed that the transfer of income due to the PBF 
was responsible for 15% of the decrease in the Gini coeffi cient during that period.
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Moreover, following the expenses in domestic debt services, they were the ones 
presenting a higher proportion of expenses. 
When considering individual evolution, social security expenses presented 
a higher rate of growth (157%) than others during the same period. As a proportion 
of total expenditure, these expenses incorporated an increase of fi ve percentage 
points between 2004 and 2014. Santos et al. (2017) argued that the rise in security 
spending is related to real minimum wage gain of approximately 50% between 
2006 and 2015. And with the fact that in several states of the federation, this real 
increase in wages was passed on to active servants and, on account of legislation, 
to retired servants. Besides that there was an expansion in the number of inactive 
servers around of 38% during the same period.
Graph 1. Aggregate social expenditures of Brazilian states, 
2004-2014 (billions of R$)
0.00
200.00
400.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Assistance Health Education
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of offi cial data from the National Treasury.
Note: Data defl ated by IPCA at December 2014 prices.
Educational expenses of the Brazilian states grew by 86%, and expenses in 
health services grew by 52% in the period under analysis. As a proportion of total 
expenditures, these expenses presented an average annual participation of 16.13% 
of the total expenditure over the full period under analysis. Nevertheless, when 
comparing the fi nal year to the initial year, there was a reduction of 1.79%. Health 
spending, in turn, showed a growth of almost one percentage point from 2004 
to 2014. In part, this result is associated with the promulgation of Constitutional 
Amendment No. 29, of 2000, which enabled the growth of contributions from states 
and municipalities to health services (Benício et al., 2015).
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As for the analysis of other fi scal variables, total revenues increased by 
87% between 2004 and 2014, and total expenditures increased by 71% in real 
terms, representing an annual average variation of 6.86% and 5.89%, respectively, 
while the annual average variation in the Brazilian GDP was 3.72% over the same 
period. But the increase in total revenues occurred without changing a tax structure 
heavily based on indirect taxes, especially consumption taxes, such as the ICMS 
tax highlighted in section III. As Warren (2008) showed from extensive review 
studies, consumption taxes have a signifi cant regressive impact on the distribution 
of disposable income. In Brazil, the largest share of indirect taxes falls on the con-
sumption of goods and services that make up a larger part of the budgets of poorer 
than richer households. Specifi cally, there was an increase both in the tax burden 
and in public expenditures in relation to GDP over the period analyzed without 
switching the regressive tax structure. 
The current revenues (including fi nancial revenues), which account for 
almost all revenues, reduced their share of total revenue by more than fi ve percen-
tage points between 2004 and 2014. Consequently, capital revenues have become 
a larger share of revenue, registering a growth of over four percentage points over 
the full period. In terms of its annual performance, there were decreases of 38.72% 
in 2007, of 33.33% in 2011 and of 6.13% in 2014; the average growth rate was 
27.52% over the full period. For the years registering growth in capital revenues, 
2008, 2009 and 2012 are highlighted, which showed values well above the average: 
56.19%, 99.19% and 137.10%, respectively.
Current expenditures accounted for an average of 87.28% of total expendi-
tures over the full period, with emphasis on personnel expenses, which represented 
an average of 42% in the period. In real terms, expenditure on personnel and social 
charges increased more than 95% between 2004 and 2014, an average of 7.34% 
per year. This result is associated with the signifi cant real wage increases that state 
public administrations have granted both to active and inactive servers.
Capital expenditure, in turn, represents approximately 13% of total expen-
ditures, and approximately half of this number is investments. While the broad 
category of capital expenditure presented an average annual growth rate of 8.74%, 
investment expenditure grew by an average of 12.32% per year over the same 
period. Comparing 2014 with 2004, these growth rates were 110% and 158%, 
respectively.
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III.2. Econometric Model
To identify the impact of fi scal policy on inequality, we adopt the following 
equation as a base:
Yit = αYit−1 + βRTit + ηDTit + μi + eit   (1)
where Yit is the measure of income inequality for the 27 Brazilian states i in 
period t, Yit−1 is the dependent variable lagged over a period, RT is the total revenue, 
DT is the total expenditure, μ is an unobservable effect, and eit is the error term. 
To identify which revenues and areas of public spending infl uence income 
inequality, we expand model (1) as follows:
Yit = αYit−1 + ø1 RCit + ø2RKit +  + μi + eit    (2)
where RCit is the current revenue, RKit  is the capital revenue, and EJit  is the 
set of the seven expenditure groups: social assistance and social security, education 
and culture, judiciary, infrastructure, debt service, health services, and others.
We use a dynamic6 panel System Generalized Method of Moment (GMM)7 
approach to estimate equations (1) and (2). This estimator, proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), allows for an unbiased estimate 
of all variables and is appropriate in addressing situations in which independent 
variables are not strictly exogenous, meaning they are correlated with past and 
possibly current realizations of the error (Roodman, 2009).
The potential origin of endogeneity is the omitted variables, which are 
present in the error term and are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, 
included in the dynamic model. Other potential sources of endogeneity that are a 
6 The dynamics of the model is usually undertaken by including a lag of the dependent variable as a 
right hand side variable. Moreover, even when the coeffi cient of lagged dependent variable is not 
the focus of interest, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering 
consistent estimates of other parameters (Bond, 2002).
7 The analyses performed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2001) using the Monte 
Carlo method provide evidence that, in the presence of highly persistent series, the GMM system is 
more robust than other dynamic panel techniques. In addition, the study performed by Soto (2009) 
using Monte Carlo simulations for several standard estimators in panel analysis, when N (number 
of individuals) is small, concludes that the GMM system estimator generates the result with the least 
bias, revealing it as the most appropriate method.
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concern in this empirical analysis are the time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity 
(unobservable difference between Brazilian states as culture, structural conditions, 
institutional level, that are not captured by available and observable data and, con-
sequently are related to omitted variables) and, simultaneity (when two variables 
simultaneously affect each other). Then, the endogeneity problem is related to the 
fact that we cannot control unobserved state factors that could infl uence the income 
inequality and, that changes in revenue and expenditure levels affect the inequality 
measure and vice versa.
The GMM method is useful in trying to address the endogeneity problem 
as it uses a set of instruments, contained within the panel itself, for potentially 
endogenous regressors, removing the need for external instruments. In other words, 
using second and deeper lags of potentially endogenous variables (and their diffe-
rences) as instruments makes these variables not correlated with the error term. For 
example, the past values of expenditure can be used as an instrument for current 
expenditure. 
The validity of the GMM system estimator is conditional upon the exoge-
neity of the instruments. To verify this exogeneity, we apply two key tests. The 
fi rst one is the Hansen8 test of over-identifi cation that yields a J-statistic, which is 
distributed χ2 under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis implies that some of the instruments are not valid. The 
second one is the difference-in-Hansen test (or C test) that inspects the exogeneity 
of a particular subset of instruments9. 
The GMM method is also subject to the absence of second-order autocorre-
lation of the errors; therefore, we apply the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation 
in the fi rst-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
The implementation of this empirical strategy is found in the next section.
8 The Hansen J statistic, which does not require homoscedasticity for testing over-identi-
fi cation, instead of the Sargan statistic, which requires homoscedasticity. 
9 However, many instruments may generate a possible over-identifi cation of the endogenous variables, 
not allowing adequate treatment of endogeneity and generating biased estimates, and may also 
impede the power of the Hansen test itself. To work around this problem, we collapse the instrument 
matrix, which specifi es creating one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one 
for each time period, variable, and lag distance (Wintoki et al., 2012).
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IV. BENCHMARK RESULTS
The idea is to verify the impact of fi scal policy – for revenue and expendi-
ture variables10 – on income inequality measured by the Gini index. We proceed 
from the aggregate to the disaggregate level. That is, fi rst we ascertain the impact 
of total revenues and expenditures on inequality, and these two broad categories 
are then disaggregated, but with a focus on expenditures. This strategy means that 
it is possible to estimate both the general impact of fi scal policy on inequality 
and the marginal contribution of some fi scal components, whether of revenue or 
expenditure.
Table 2 shows the outcomes of the dynamic regressions and the diagnostic 
tests, which are all supportive of the estimation choices made. The Arellano-Bond 
test for fi rst- and second-order serial correlation (AR1 and AR2) suggests that, for 
most specifi cations, the former is present but the latter is not, which is coherent 
with our underlying assumptions, and the p-values for the Hansen tests are above 
the minimum of 0.25, as recommended by Roodman (2009). Thus, the test of over-
identifi cation cannot reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid, and 
the difference-in-Hansen p-values imply that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the subset of instruments (GMM or IV) used is truly exogenous. All the explana-
tory variables are treated as potentially endogenous, due to the instruments being 
lagged in 2 or 3 years.
In all the columns of Table 2, the lagged dependent variable is statistically sig-
nifi cant, which supports our preference for dynamic models as the main econometric 
tool of this study. This variable captures the past (or history) of the whole model and 
not merely the past of the dependent variable (Greene, 2012; Piper, 2014).
The lagged Gini coeffi cient obtained is approximately 1, signifi cant and 
positive, meaning that the impact of the fi scal variables on income inequality is 
more historic than contemporaneous. Other studies that use the GMM system also 
fi nd a similar result for the lagged dependent variable, although with differences 
in the fi scal variables used, period length and the groups investigated (Woo et al., 
2013; Azevedo et al., 2014)11.
10 In this way, all the elements of the budgetary restriction of the federative units are considered.
11 Woo et al. (2013) found a large (more than 1) and signifi cant positive infl uence of lagged Gini on 
current Gini. In Azevedo et al. (2014), the coeffi cient on the lagged dependent variable is approxi-
mately 0.60. 
Estudios económicos N° 73, Julio-Diciembre 2019. 43-70 59
GIVING WITH ONE HAND AND TAKING AWAY WITH THE OTHER
Table 2. The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality (System GMM Results)
Dependent Variable: Gini A B C
Gini (t-1) 0.84*** 0.99*** 0.99***
Total Revenue 0.11*
Total Expenditure -0.12*
Current Revenue -0.05 -0.13
Capital Revenue 0.47*** 0.24*
Social Security Exp. -0.20*** -0.16**
Education Exp. 0.40 0.13
Judiciary Exp. -0.37 -0.22
Infrastructure Exp. -0.51 -0.41**
Debt Exp. 0.21* 0.28*
Health Exp. 0.50
Other Exp. 0.36
Instruments 19 26 30
Obs. 270 270 270
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.10 0.34 0.19
Hansen test 0.21 0.56 0.81
Dif. GMM 0.34 0.70 0.92
Dif. IV - 0.66 0.93
Source: prepared by the authors.
Notes: data in 10 000 Reais per capita; The Dif. GMM and Dif. IV refer to difference-in-Hansen test 
of exogeneity. The values reported for the autocorrelation and Hansen tests are p-values. All estima-
tions include orthogonal deviations, two-step and collapsed. Bias-corrected heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors driven by Windmeijer (2005). ***, ** and * indicate statistical signifi cance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Column A shows that total revenue and total expenditures are signifi cant and 
that, in the Brazilian states, between 2004 and 2014, the increase in total revenue 
generated an increase in inequality, while an increase in total expenditures genera-
ted a decrease in the inequality of income distribution.
As already indicated, the negative effect of revenue on the inequality of 
income distribution is probably related to the fact that the Brazilian tax system 
is concentrated on indirect taxes. We further discuss this aspect in the section on 
robustness evaluations, where we add an index of progressivity as a control varia-
ble. On the other hand, the positive effect of expenditure on the Gini index is 
possible in capturing the infl uence of social expenditure, which, as the literature 
shows, has a priori signifi cant potential to reduce inequality (Warren, 2008; Mar-
tinez-Vazquez et al., 2014).
Columns B and C disaggregate the total revenue into current and capital 
revenues and the total expenditure in some categories. In regression B, the varia-
ble on expenditure on assistance and social security is signifi cant and negative, 
which suggests a relation with the preliminary analyses in section III.1, in which 
an increase in social spending contributes to the reduction of inequality in the 
Brazilian states. 
Capital revenues are positive and signifi cant at the level of 1% in regressions 
B and C, indicating that an increase in these revenues generates an increase in the 
inequality of income distribution. As noted in the section on descriptive analyses, 
capital revenue increased during the period investigated. This increase means the 
expansion, over the analyzed period, of the use of credit operations, public indeb-
tedness, by the Brazilian states as a source of revenue to support their expenditures.
Another variable that contributes to worsening inequality is debt expen-
diture, which is signifi cant at the level of 10%. A rise of 10,000 Reais per capita, 
with expenses related to refi nancing and public debt service, raises the Gini index 
by 0.211, and a rise of the same amount of expenses in social assistance and social 
security reduces the inequality by 0.20. In this sense, there is no net effect.
 In the fi nal regression C, which includes seven categories of expenditure, 
the social assistance and social security variable remains signifi cant and with a 
negative sign. The debt expenditure again shows a positive sign and is signifi cant; 
thus, this negative effect overcomes the positive effect of the former, and the varia-
ble infrastructure expenditure maintains the negative signal, but now with statistical 
signifi cance at 10%.
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Overall, when evaluating the structures of revenues and expenditures of 
the 27 federative units of Brazil for the period from 2004 to 2014, we fi nd that 
results coinciding with those observed in other studies confi rm the literature review. 
For example, our econometric test indicated that the so-called social expenditures 
contributed to the equalization of income, a result found in several international 
studies, such as those examining Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The econometric 
test also indicated that an increase in revenue increased income inequality, which 
was expected when considering the important role played by indirect taxes in the 
fi scal revenue of the federal units of Brazil (see the cases of Colombia and Peru, 
for example). Even the nonsignifi cant signal for education expenditures can be 
explained by two causes: 1) in Brazil, states are responsible for the provision of 
secondary education and, in some of them, also for the provision of higher edu-
cation. As shown in other studies (Chile), spending at these levels of education 
seems to have no or little effect on income distribution; and 2) most of the increase 
in education expenditures was directed to the salary increase of public employees 
working in the sector. 
Nevertheless, by separating public expenditures from those directed to 
paying the debts of the states, we fi nd that these increase the Gini index. This 
result calls for attention, and we know of no specifi c studies in Latin America that 
have demonstrated this relation. However, in a cross-country panel data involving 
120 economies, Salti (2015) found evidence similar to that presented in our study, 
explaining this result in terms of those parcels with higher income holding pro-
portionally more public debt securities and thus receiving more interest transfers.
Thus, benchmark results suggest that there are fi scal variables that signifi -
cantly affect inequality in income distribution in the Brazilian states and contribute 
to its reduction, such as total expenditure, expenditures with social assistance and 
social security, and infrastructure. In addition, there are also fi scal variables, such 
as total and capital revenue and debt expenditure that increase inequality. We recog-
nize, however, that our fi ndings only point to evidence of correlation between some 
types of revenues and fi scal expenditures with the measure of income inequality, 
without necessarily determining the causal relationship between such variables.
V. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
Though the diagnostic tests, reported at the bottom of Table 2, indicate that 
the models perform well, certifying these results, we decided to perform a rigorous 
robustness evaluation in three different steps. First, we employ another measure of 
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income inequality, the Theil index, which is more sensitive to changes in the upper 
tail of income distribution, while the Gini index, the most widely used inequality 
measure, is more sensitive to changes in shares in the middle of the distribution 
(Hoffman, 1998; Bastagli et al., 2012). Second, we include additional control varia-
bles to the base model. Third, we adopt a different methodology (static models12) 
to run the benchmark regressions presented in Table 2.
The results of these three steps are largely in line with those in the previous 
section, with the majority of the variables of interest being statistically signifi cant 
and showing the same signs13. Specifi cally, Table 3 presents the results that we 
obtained from estimating equations (1) and (2) when other control variables were 
included in the analysis along with the tax and expenditure variables. Following 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2014), we consider as control variables those that have 
been consistently found to play a signifi cant role in explaining income inequality 
in the literature14.
Table 3. Adding Controls in the Benchmark Regressions (System GMM Results)
Dependent Variable: Gini A B C D E
Gini (t-1) 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.62***
Gini (t-2) 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.35***
Total Revenue 0.08** 0.01* 0.15**
Total Expenditure -0.09** -0.11*
Current Revenue -0.05 -0.07
Capital Revenue 0.55** 0.53***
12 The static models, fi xed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE), cannot provide the entire history of 
the model, so they are not directly comparable to dynamic models (Wintok et al., 2012).
13 To save space, we display only the results of the second step (additional controls); the others can be 
provided upon request.
14 Such as GDP per capita, unemployment, education level, progressivity index and economic open-
ness. We measure progressivity using the ratio of direct tax revenue/indirect tax revenue, as González 
and Martner (2012) did, and the openness using the value of exports plus imports relative to GDP.
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Social Security Exp. -0.16** -0.14*** -0.16***
Education Exp. 0.20 0.18 0.10
Judiciary Exp. 0.14 -0.613
Infrastructure Exp. -0.40 -0.33** -0.61***
Debt Exp. 0.17 0.25* -0.25
Health Exp. 0.020
GDP pc -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Unemployment 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.18
Education level 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Progressivity -0.01 -0.12** -0.06 -0.11 -0.16
Open 0.05 -0.08 0.15 0.09 0.16
Obs. 243 243 243 243 243
AR(1) 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.011
AR(2) 0.753 0.531 0.554 0.587 0.816
Hansen test 0.345 0.418 0.577 0.774 0.385
Source: prepared by the authors.
Notes: the fi scal data is in 10 000 Reais per capita; The Dif. GMM and Dif. IV refer to difference-in-
Hansen test of exogeneity. The values reported for the autocorrelation and Hansen tests are p-values. 
All estimations include orthogonal deviations, two-step and collapsed. Bias-corrected heteroscedasti-
city-robust standard errors driven by Windmeijer (2005). ***, ** and * indicate statistical signifi cance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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As expected, the coeffi cients for total revenue and total expenditure are 
positive and negative, respectively, and continue to be signifi cant in all specifi -
cations. More important for our purposes is that, for the majority of the results in 
Table 2, when we add new controls, the coeffi cients continue to be signifi cant and 
their signals do not change. 
Notably, however, the results in Table 3 show that the only extra control 
variable that is statistically signifi cant is the progressivity index, with a positive 
effect on inequality. Thus, the Brazilian state with a more progressive tax structure 
may have a lesser inequality income distribution. This result is in line with the 
literature (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2008; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2014).
It is noteworthy that among the variables of the social expenditure set, 
throughout various robustness evaluations (additional controls, different measure of 
inequality and alternative methodology), the variable referring to social assistance 
and social security expenditures has a positive impact on inequality in the income 
distribution of the Brazilian states15. Santos et al. (2017) also obtained that these 
expenditures are important for reducing the inequality of income in the Brazilian 
states. Similarly, González and Martner (2012) found that, for Latin American 
countries, by separating social spending from public expenditure on education, an 
increase in the former can explain the improvements in the Gini coeffi cient.
In summary, based on the evidence presented in this study, we can affi rm 
that fi scal policy, more specifi cally the structure of expenditures and taxes of the 
states, is important for reducing inequality in income distribution, which is in line 
with the literature (Chu et al., 2004; Afonso et al., 2010; Bastagli et al., 2012; 
Azevedo et al., 2014; Lustig, 2016). However, those responsible for conducting 
the fi scal policies of the Brazilian states must be aware that an increase in special 
charges worsens inequality, and this is strongly shown in the results of this study.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The objective of this study was to investigate the potential impact of fi scal 
policy on income inequality of the Brazilian states with special attention to public 
15 In other specifi cations (the results of which were not reported), for example, when only this variable 
and total revenue were included or when all expenditure groups, except for health services, were 
inserted with the disaggregated revenues, this component of the social area has always appeared as 
signifi cant and with a negative sign.
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spending, which was divided into seven groups. The period from 2004 to 2014 was 
analyzed using the System GMM method.
The results indicated that total expenditures, social assistance and secu-
rity expenditures, and infrastructure expenditures are related to reducing income 
inequality, which, measured by the Gini index, decreased from 0.56 to 0.50 in 
the analyzed period. In its turn, total and capital revenues, expenses with special 
charges, accentuate inequality in income distribution. Thus, it can be said that the 
governments are giving with one hand and taking away with the other.
In general, we found evidence that the spending policies of the Brazilian 
states may affect their respective income inequality indexes. That is, the states 
and the federal district have the room to implement pro-equity (or anti-equity) 
fi scal policies, considering only how these federative units decide to allocate their 
revenues in different types of expenditures. In turn, given the Brazilian regressive 
tax structure, we observed that increases in tax revenues contribute to the rise of 
inequality in income distribution. 
In view of the evidence presented here, we emphasize the need to promote 
a tax reform capable of establishing a more progressive structure in the country. 
This reform, coupled with a public spending structure that privileges those with a 
greater capacity to raise equity and higher effi ciency and effectiveness in spending 
on education and public health service, could provide Brazil with a fi scal policy 
effectively able to collaborate in reducing inequality of income.
Considering the current tax structure, the net effects of expanding, for exam-
ple, social spending by means of a higher tax collection, may not be positive for the 
objective of reducing income disparities. Therefore, discussion of how to determine 
and qualify social spending levels in Brazil, which are necessary to combat poverty 
and reduce social and income inequalities, is directly related to the issue of the 
revision of the overall progressivity of the tax-benefi t system.
One distinct fi nding in our work has been the signifi cant reductive impact on 
income inequality of state investment spending. How can this impact be explained? 
One hypothesis is that such investments generally involved civil construction pro-
jects, a highly demanding sector of unskilled labor in Brazil. Thus, the state gover-
nments, in increasing their spending on investments, also increased the demand 
for the production factor of low-qualifi cation work. We will test this hypothesis 
in future research. If this hypothesis is found valid, there is a possibility that the 
improvement in income distribution observed during the study period was not a 
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structural change and could be reversed by a decrease in these expenses with the 
economic and fi scal crisis observed in Brazil beginning in 2015.
APPENDIX A
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics
Variables n min max mean sd
Gini 297 0.42 0.63 0.53 0.04
Theil 297 0.33 1.31 0.58 0.11
Total Revenue 297 172.93 92 293.91 4380.74 7958.67
Total Expenditure 297 159.72 91 295.66 4148.81 7565.07
Current Revenue 297 184.28 81 499.49 4297.31 7125.74
Capital Revenue 297 2.71 2082.30 210.56 284.21
Social Security Exp. 297 12.94 12 308.81 514.35 1185.78
Education Exp. 297 22.21 17 821.93 685.37 1371.21
Judiciary Exp. 297 0.00 5341.34 271.40 457.94
Infrastructure Exp. 297 9.28 8019.27 351.12 649.27
Debt Exp. 297 9.07 25 346.24 858.82 2174.40
Health Exp. 297 21.55 9186.24 508.44 819.91
Other Exp 297 31.94 7678.57 629.86 716.35
Open 297 0.00 0.32 0.10 0.07
GDP pc 297 4763.11 60 156.92 17 485.70 9920.58
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Unemployment 297 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.03
Education level (years) 297 4.18 10.08 6.75 1.15
Progressivity Index 297 0.07 0.52 0.15 0.07
Source: prepared by the authors. The fi scal data is in Reais per capita and are from the National Tre-
asury; GDP are from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, as per its initials in 
Portuguese) in the Regional Accounts of Brazil; Education level, unemployment and open are from 
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA, as per its initials in Portuguese).
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